[Oisf-users] Inconsistent Alerting
derek_smithg at yahoo.com
derek_smithg at yahoo.com
Mon Feb 22 16:29:40 UTC 2016
Hello everyone,
I am new to the mailing list. Sorry for the long email, Ijust wanted to include enough information in case anyone has come across asimilar problem.
I have been running Suricata against several pcaps withdifferent yaml configurations and am seeing the total count of alerts changefrom one run to another, or even with the same yaml but run at a differenttime. Has anyone come across anything similar before?
Below are details on the rules whose counts change and theyaml files I am using.
Suricata-2.0.11
CentOS 7.1.1503
Yaml Files:
- yaml1: very out ofthe box yaml, except moved address-groups and other locally defined variablesto an include file.
- yaml2: changed max-pending-packets from 1024 to645000, and detect-engine.profile from medium to high.
- threading1 and threading2:turned on cpu-affinity but set them to use [ ‘all’ ] cpu’s, with detect-ratioset to .5 and 1 respectively.
(all are only outputting eve.json)
I ran them against 3 pcaps of sizes roughly 100GB, 200GB, and400GB, and tallied the alert counts, outputting any that were not the same acrossthe board.
100 GB pcap
sid yaml1 yaml2 th1 th2
2001805 : 139 137 137 137
12037 : 1 - - -
2101633 : 132 129 129 129
200 GB pcap
2009375 : 91134 91127 91119 91122
2010935 : 657 657 662 657
400 GB pcap
2001805 : 96 96 96 99
2010935 : 818 818 880 818
2010937 : 160 160 192 160
2101633 : 138 136 138 137
They are mostly the same rules in common misbehaving. Theyare listed below.
emerging-chat.rules:alert tcp $HOME_NET any <> $EXTERNAL_NETany (msg:"ET CHAT ICQ Message"; flow: established;content:"|2A02|"; depth: 2; content:"|000400060000|";offset: 6; depth: 6; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2001805;classtype:policy-violation; sid:2001805; rev:5;)
content-replace.rules:alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any ->$HOME_NET any (msg:"CONTENT-REPLACE AIM deny in-bound file transferattempts"; flow:to_client,established; content:"*|02|"; depth:2;content:"|00 04 00 07|"; within:8; distance:4; content:"|09|F|13|CL|7F11 D1 82 22|DEST|00|"; content:"DEST"; distance:-5;replace:"XXXX"; byte_test:2,=,0,-24,relative;classtype:policy-violation; sid:12037; rev:3;)
emerging-chat.rules:alert tcp $AIM_SERVERS any ->$HOME_NET any (msg:"GPL CHAT AIM receive message"; flow:to_client;content:"*|02|"; depth:2; content:"|00 04 00 07|"; depth:4;offset:6; classtype:policy-violation; sid:2101633; rev:7;)
emerging-chat.rules:alert tcp $HOME_NET any <>$EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"ET CHAT General MSN Chat Activity"; flow:established; content:"Content-Type|3A|"; http_header;content:"application/x-msn-messenger"; http_header;reference:url,www.hypothetic.org/docs/msn/general/http_examples.php;reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2009375; classtype:policy-violation;sid:2009375; rev:3;)
emerging-policy.rules:alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any ->$HOME_NET 1433 (msg:"ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to MSSQL port 1433";flow:to_server; flags:S; threshold: type limit, count 5, seconds 60, trackby_src; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010935; classtype:bad-unknown;sid:2010935; rev:2;)
emerging-policy.rules:alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any ->$HOME_NET 3306 (msg:"ET POLICY Suspicious inbound to mySQL port3306"; flow:to_server; flags:S; threshold: type limit, count 5, seconds60, track by_src; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010937;classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2010937; rev:2;)
This may be a different issue, but I have looked into 12037,which is very similar to 2101633 but with added replace and byte_test keywords,and think it might be a false positive. From carving out the ip’s involved withit from the pcap and running Suricata on that alone it hits that one alertabout 50% of the time. I ran it once with alert-debug output and found thepacket it’s supposedly alerting on and cannot find the byte pattern that wouldmatch to it.
Debug output regarding sid 12037:
STREAM DATA:
. . .
0030 02 00 01 00 05 00 04 47 BB 2B AC 00 0D 00 50 09 .......G .+....P.
0040 46 13 43 4C 7F 11 D1 82 22 44 45 53 54 00 00 09 F.CL.... "DEST...
. . .
0160 06 00 04 10 02 00 01 00 0D 00 50 09 46 13 43 4C ........ ..P.F.CL
0170 7F 11D1 82 22 44 45 53 54 00 00 09 46 13 454C ...."DES T...F.EL
It is my understanding that byte_test is looking for 00 00,24 bytes before 53 54 (because of content match “DEST” and “relative” keyword),but there is 00 04 in both.
Please let me know if you have any insight as to what isgoing on. I would greatly appreciate it.
Thank you,
Derek
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