[Discussion] What are we making? -- CLIENT Side
Matt Jonkman
jonkman at jonkmans.com
Sun Oct 19 16:48:01 UTC 2008
Martin Holste wrote:
> I'm guessing that the intent is to be the "detection" component of the
> Trusted Internet Connection (TIC)
> (http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2007/12/feds-plan-to-reduce-then-monitor.html),
> in which the mandate is to protect all federal assets, especially the
> federal desktop environment.
Certainly a sound approach to tackle such a problem. Glad I don't have
to solve that one, it's huge among gov't agencies. Especially in the US,
but surely similar everywhere.
Even if DHS has different goals, I think
> that this group could do a great service by providing the TIC's
> protection geared toward the client-side, and I think for most sectors,
> that's where the most imminent threats lie. Again, I'm certainly not
> saying that defending servers is out of scope, just that IDS has
> historically been about defending servers as the primary goal, with
> clients secondary, and I think that needs to be reversed now.
I agree. At emerging threats we've been lately heavy into post-infection
signatures in our research. There are many vulnerabilities out there in
client apps, but I'd venture to say that a very high percentage of the
infections out there aren't the result of a remotely exploitable
vulnerability. Most come from users clicking on email attachments,
installing fake software/codecs, and visiting websites with hostile code.
We've tried many times to write effective signatures to detect hostile
html/java/gifs, etc. It's just not feasible as is. Code is too flexible
for signature-based approaches. You can say the same thing a hundred
ways, especially in html.
So how can we go after client side?
I really REALLY am not excited about trying to make a windows client.
Not only does that open up a huge responsibility in support and the
inevitable bluescreens, but I have had a difficult time over the years
believing that any process on ANY os (especially windows) could be
trusted and independant enough to watch itself. Take into account how
easy it is for trojans and rootkits to shut down antivirus, or blind it.
And these are products with hundreds of the most skilled coders around
working on them.
I know we're sharp as a community, but I don't think that's a battle we
want to get in to. So how can we do it at the network layer?
Sandboxing?
Virtual emulators?
Or do we continue the thinking that for any infection to be of any use
to anyone it has to generate traffic? It has to call home, send spam,
report stolen information, something. So we concentrate on detecting and
stopping the post infection?
What does everyone think about that?
Matt
>
> --Martin
>
> On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 9:31 PM, Andre Ludwig <aludwig at packetspy.com
> <mailto:aludwig at packetspy.com>> wrote:
>
> I doubt the intent of the DHS is to simply do good, they are most likely
> much more focused on producing technology that allows them to
> detect/mitigate/prevent attacks against critical components. This of
> course means detecting attacks that fly below the threshold of detection
> for todays technology. If it comes to "doing good" or detecting state
> sponsored attacks against critical components (think custom attacks
> against unknown vulns), i'm going to go out on a limb and say they would
> rather protect the critical component vs the enduser.
>
> What you are discussing still has value and merit but im not so sure it
> is what should be focused on, but of course I am not the person to
> decide such things.
>
> Andre
>
>
> Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon & Hannah wrote:
> > Question: what are we making? Oh, yeah, I read the blurb: "The
> OISF has been
> > chartered and funded to build a next-generation intrusion
> detection and prevention
> > engine. This project will consider every new and existing
> technology, concept and
> > idea to build a completely open source licensed engine."
> >
> > OK, we're making an IDS. But I think we need to be more specific.
> In particular,
> > we need to answer the question of "who."
> >
> > Since the DHS has provided money, I suspect there would be an
> automatic
> > assumption that this is a heavy-duty device intended for use to
> protect major
> > servers and nodes in the critical information infrastructure.
> (Whatever that
> > means.) This kind of thing is built by professionals, for
> professionals. Trained
> > people.
> >
> > However, given the current computing environment, I think it would
> be relatively
> > easy to make a case that such a device is not going to do all that
> much good. That
> > a more accessible device, intended for "Grannyx" users, would
> actually do more to
> > protect the infrastructure. After all, it isn't major nodes on
> the net that make up
> > botnets, it's the little guys. Protect them, and you reduce the
> threat. This is the
> > "low hanging fruit" for the blackhats, so protecting that crop is
> going to give us
> > the greatest benefit for the commitment of resources.
> >
> > This makes a difference. Not, perhaps, in terms of questions
> about multithreading
> > analysis streams using graphics co-processors. But certainly in
> most other areas.
> >
> > We've talked about extensibility. If we create a standard
> template or format for
> > signatures, the "who" makes a difference. Professionals need a
> warning and a
> > packet. Grannyx users need a warning, no packet, a clear
> explanation of what and
> > how important, and a recommended course of action. Makes a
> difference to the
> > template.
> >
> > In terms of my recommendation of a paran-o-meter, it makes a
> difference.
> > Actually, I see huge debates over initial settings: do we keep it
> low to keep from
> > crying wolf, or keep it high to keep people as safe as possible.
> But one thing that
> > should be done is make the paranoia settings not-quite-obvious up
> front, so that
> > somebody needs to know a little about the implications before they
> start fiddling
> > with settings.
> >
> > Heck, if it's a professional device, we don't need to worry about
> the interface at
> > all. If it's for Granny, we definitely do.
> >
> > It also makes a difference in terms of the technology to be
> included. If it is for
> > professionals, we can throw in everything. If for Granny, we need
> to make a
> > careful choice about maximum protection for minimum performance drain.
> >
> > ====================== (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer)
> > rslade at vcn.bc.ca <mailto:rslade at vcn.bc.ca>
> slade at victoria.tc.ca <mailto:slade at victoria.tc.ca>
> rslade at computercrime.org <mailto:rslade at computercrime.org>
> > I'm getting so absent-minded that sometimes in the middle of
> > victoria.tc.ca/techrev/rms.htm
> <http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev/rms.htm>
> blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/p1/
> <http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/p1/>
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> >
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Matthew Jonkman
Emerging Threats
Phone 765-429-0398
Fax 312-264-0205
http://www.emergingthreats.net
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