[Discussion] What are we making? -- CLIENT Side
Martin Holste
mcholste at gmail.com
Sun Oct 19 17:18:59 UTC 2008
I vehemently agree with Matt about the necessity of staying out of the
client-side arena. I think that if we're going to actually produce anything
of value, we need to narrow the scope to start with. My vote is that we
consider notifying Granny that there's something bad on her PC out of scope
until we figure out how to notify Granny's ISP's network security admin that
there's something bad. If we can figure out how to reliably find successful
compromises and get that information output as actionable intelligence to
the netsec community, the rest will come in time.
For instance, if we can get to the point where we're %99.99 sure that a
given URL is bad, then we could work on setting up an alliance with a place
like Google, which already has an infrastructure for end-user notification
of bad sites (as in, the "this site may harm your computer" displayed under
links to sql injected pages). I'm sure Neils Provos would be interested in
hints from this group. I would say that blackhat SEO is 80% of the malware
infection vector right now, so that would be huge.
Someday even farther in the future, we could use a platform like OSSEC HIDS
to deliver our blacklists, or a browser plugin, but that is a carrot on a
stick for another day.
The point is that we need to start by doing one thing and doing it well:
provide the most accurate method of network-based detection and prevention
of compromises to date by leveraging the collective wisdom of the community.
On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 11:48 AM, Matt Jonkman <jonkman at jonkmans.com> wrote:
> Martin Holste wrote:
> > I'm guessing that the intent is to be the "detection" component of the
> > Trusted Internet Connection (TIC)
> > (
> http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2007/12/feds-plan-to-reduce-then-monitor.html
> ),
> > in which the mandate is to protect all federal assets, especially the
> > federal desktop environment.
>
> Certainly a sound approach to tackle such a problem. Glad I don't have
> to solve that one, it's huge among gov't agencies. Especially in the US,
> but surely similar everywhere.
>
>
> Even if DHS has different goals, I think
> > that this group could do a great service by providing the TIC's
> > protection geared toward the client-side, and I think for most sectors,
> > that's where the most imminent threats lie. Again, I'm certainly not
> > saying that defending servers is out of scope, just that IDS has
> > historically been about defending servers as the primary goal, with
> > clients secondary, and I think that needs to be reversed now.
>
> I agree. At emerging threats we've been lately heavy into post-infection
> signatures in our research. There are many vulnerabilities out there in
> client apps, but I'd venture to say that a very high percentage of the
> infections out there aren't the result of a remotely exploitable
> vulnerability. Most come from users clicking on email attachments,
> installing fake software/codecs, and visiting websites with hostile code.
>
> We've tried many times to write effective signatures to detect hostile
> html/java/gifs, etc. It's just not feasible as is. Code is too flexible
> for signature-based approaches. You can say the same thing a hundred
> ways, especially in html.
>
> So how can we go after client side?
>
> I really REALLY am not excited about trying to make a windows client.
> Not only does that open up a huge responsibility in support and the
> inevitable bluescreens, but I have had a difficult time over the years
> believing that any process on ANY os (especially windows) could be
> trusted and independant enough to watch itself. Take into account how
> easy it is for trojans and rootkits to shut down antivirus, or blind it.
> And these are products with hundreds of the most skilled coders around
> working on them.
>
> I know we're sharp as a community, but I don't think that's a battle we
> want to get in to. So how can we do it at the network layer?
>
> Sandboxing?
>
> Virtual emulators?
>
> Or do we continue the thinking that for any infection to be of any use
> to anyone it has to generate traffic? It has to call home, send spam,
> report stolen information, something. So we concentrate on detecting and
> stopping the post infection?
>
> What does everyone think about that?
>
> Matt
>
>
> >
> > --Martin
> >
> > On Sat, Oct 18, 2008 at 9:31 PM, Andre Ludwig <aludwig at packetspy.com
> > <mailto:aludwig at packetspy.com>> wrote:
> >
> > I doubt the intent of the DHS is to simply do good, they are most
> likely
> > much more focused on producing technology that allows them to
> > detect/mitigate/prevent attacks against critical components. This of
> > course means detecting attacks that fly below the threshold of
> detection
> > for todays technology. If it comes to "doing good" or detecting
> state
> > sponsored attacks against critical components (think custom attacks
> > against unknown vulns), i'm going to go out on a limb and say they
> would
> > rather protect the critical component vs the enduser.
> >
> > What you are discussing still has value and merit but im not so sure
> it
> > is what should be focused on, but of course I am not the person to
> > decide such things.
> >
> > Andre
> >
> >
> > Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon & Hannah wrote:
> > > Question: what are we making? Oh, yeah, I read the blurb: "The
> > OISF has been
> > > chartered and funded to build a next-generation intrusion
> > detection and prevention
> > > engine. This project will consider every new and existing
> > technology, concept and
> > > idea to build a completely open source licensed engine."
> > >
> > > OK, we're making an IDS. But I think we need to be more specific.
> > In particular,
> > > we need to answer the question of "who."
> > >
> > > Since the DHS has provided money, I suspect there would be an
> > automatic
> > > assumption that this is a heavy-duty device intended for use to
> > protect major
> > > servers and nodes in the critical information infrastructure.
> > (Whatever that
> > > means.) This kind of thing is built by professionals, for
> > professionals. Trained
> > > people.
> > >
> > > However, given the current computing environment, I think it would
> > be relatively
> > > easy to make a case that such a device is not going to do all that
> > much good. That
> > > a more accessible device, intended for "Grannyx" users, would
> > actually do more to
> > > protect the infrastructure. After all, it isn't major nodes on
> > the net that make up
> > > botnets, it's the little guys. Protect them, and you reduce the
> > threat. This is the
> > > "low hanging fruit" for the blackhats, so protecting that crop is
> > going to give us
> > > the greatest benefit for the commitment of resources.
> > >
> > > This makes a difference. Not, perhaps, in terms of questions
> > about multithreading
> > > analysis streams using graphics co-processors. But certainly in
> > most other areas.
> > >
> > > We've talked about extensibility. If we create a standard
> > template or format for
> > > signatures, the "who" makes a difference. Professionals need a
> > warning and a
> > > packet. Grannyx users need a warning, no packet, a clear
> > explanation of what and
> > > how important, and a recommended course of action. Makes a
> > difference to the
> > > template.
> > >
> > > In terms of my recommendation of a paran-o-meter, it makes a
> > difference.
> > > Actually, I see huge debates over initial settings: do we keep it
> > low to keep from
> > > crying wolf, or keep it high to keep people as safe as possible.
> > But one thing that
> > > should be done is make the paranoia settings not-quite-obvious up
> > front, so that
> > > somebody needs to know a little about the implications before they
> > start fiddling
> > > with settings.
> > >
> > > Heck, if it's a professional device, we don't need to worry about
> > the interface at
> > > all. If it's for Granny, we definitely do.
> > >
> > > It also makes a difference in terms of the technology to be
> > included. If it is for
> > > professionals, we can throw in everything. If for Granny, we need
> > to make a
> > > careful choice about maximum protection for minimum performance
> drain.
> > >
> > > ====================== (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer)
> > > rslade at vcn.bc.ca <mailto:rslade at vcn.bc.ca>
> > slade at victoria.tc.ca <mailto:slade at victoria.tc.ca>
> > rslade at computercrime.org <mailto:rslade at computercrime.org>
> > > I'm getting so absent-minded that sometimes in the middle
> of
> > > victoria.tc.ca/techrev/rms.htm
> > <http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev/rms.htm>
> > blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/p1/
> > <http://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/author/p1/>
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> >
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>
> --
> --------------------------------------------
> Matthew Jonkman
> Emerging Threats
> Phone 765-429-0398
> Fax 312-264-0205
> http://www.emergingthreats.net
> --------------------------------------------
>
> PGP: http://www.jonkmans.com/mattjonkman.asc
>
>
>
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