[Discussion] What are we making? -- CLIENT Side
Andre Ludwig
aludwig at packetspy.com
Tue Oct 21 18:09:25 UTC 2008
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In my humble honest opinion we should stay out of the client side game,
there are plenty of products that serve those needs. If you want to
dabble in that client side may I suggest research into behavior based
detection/mitigation of malware. (its the hot new freshness)
That being said there is tons of movement in that arena in place, and in
all honesty the weakest link at this point in time IS NOT client side
technology (the issue there is ADOPTION of what is currently available
IMHO). What is absolutely horrible in its current state is IDS/IPS, as
it simply can not keep up with application layer attacks. Granted this
is easier to handle on the client side, but who exactly wants easy
anyways? If you can create the right technology that scales properly
and put it in the "cloud" you will be light years ahead of the rest of
the industry as far as capability.
As this group seems to be more of a "here is some grant money, come up
with something interesting and creative", I dont think the value is
really there to produce carbon copies of existing technology for the
client side. Not to say that there wouldn't be value in a open source
alternative to current commercial offerings for endpoint security, I
just think this opportunity should not be spent chasing the known. We
should look at this as an opportunity to prove a few crucial points.
1. This community can work together in an effective collaborative
approach to produce something of value.
2. An open and transparent approach can produce meaningful results. (in
reference to point 1)
3. We can in fact "build a next-generation intrusion detection and
prevention engine"
Lets try to focus on what works, what doesnt work, and what doesnt exist
yet.
(again just my two cents)
An example of how horrible IDS/IPS is in its current state can be seen
by using the technique used in eescan from Matt Richards. Pay
particularly close attention to the "random chunks" of exploit
feature. No IDS I know of can properly handle such a technique of
obfuscation, and this illustrates the massive weakness of NIDS.
www.eescan.net/downloads/DC15.pdf
http://code.google.com/p/eescan/
Andre Ludwig
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