[Discussion] What are we making? -- CLIENT Side

[Matt Jonkman]

Martin Holste wrote:
> I like the idea, but are there really that many different actions to be
> taken, and aren't they going to be org specific?  If I know that an IP
> is spamming, I don't just want to block them from emailing, I want to
> block all access from that IP since it is untrustworthy. 

I want the ip reputation data to be categorized. For instance the IP
would have a reputation number in spam, phishing, malware host, CnC,
known bot, scanner, etc. Maybe stuff to cover underground forums, whatever.

There'd be an average score amassing all of the categories, and the end
user could weight each category to be more an influence on the average,
or even just make block decisions on a few categories they're interested
in.

That make sense? So if I ran a mail farm I could weight the spam
category very high, or just look at that alone. Or if I were protecting
a net of users I'd probably take the average but weight the CnC and
Malware hosts higher.

Matt


 But I do think
> there is a lot of value in developing and distributing better language
> for describing why the given IP/host is now on the list and other
> descriptions.  I'm more for giving orgs the most information that we
> can, and leaving it to them to implement the actual blocking decisions.
> 
> --Martin
> 
> On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 5:35 PM, Blake Hartstein <urule99 at gmail.com
> <mailto:urule99 at gmail.com>> wrote:
> 
>     What if we focus on developing and distributing a better language for
>     communicating actionable events?
>     The idea is to make all intelligence more valuable and immediate. If I
>     see this input event, alert, network, ISP, javascript, URL, how does it
>     impact me, and what do I do about it? Instead of just collecting and
>     distributing, the goal is to direct the actions for (ISP takedown,
>     firewall, admin action, more). This enhances all of the prior research
>     we've already done.
> 
> 
>     Blake
> 
> 
> 
>     robert.jamison at bt.com <mailto:robert.jamison at bt.com> wrote:
>     > It seems we're a split camp with:
>     >
>     > [Keynesian CAMP]
>     > Client Side Product/Service with ability to protect/detect
>     compromise on
>     > grannyx home user
>     > *scope most thoroughly represented by Martin's " RFC: Proposal for
>     > Analysis Framework"
>     >
>     > [Supply Side CAMP]
>     > Focus on server side protection for net critical assets
>     > *Andre/Jack "What is absolutely horrible in its current state is
>     > IDS/IPS" / "Client side is simply not possible due to political and
>     > religious issues."
>     >
>     > Additional notes gathered (I've just caught up on my reading;-)
>     >
>     > (a) Consideration for re-write defanging capability as inline
>     protection
>     > (b) Efficiency in stream storage--essentially normalize data
>     inspection
>     > so it doesn't have to be redone by multiple engines
>     > (c) XML vs. Binary distribution of verbose alerts vs. instruction
>     > inferred datapoints
>     > (d) Consideration for extending existing project Bro
>     >
>     > Anything I'm missing?
>     >
>     > Rob
> 
> 

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Matthew Jonkman
Emerging Threats
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